>> from the library ofcongress in washington, dc. >> jason steinhauer:well, good afternoon. my name is jason steinhauer. i'm a program specialistat the john w kluge center at the library of congress. before we begin today'sprogram, please take a moment to check your cell phonesand other electronic devices. and please set them to silent. thank you.
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today's program is titled"profiles in statesmanship, 20th century breakthroughs,21st century challenges." it features scholar bruce jentleson, who holds the henry a.kissinger chair in foreign policy and international relations hereat the john w. kluge center. while at the library, bruce hasbeen working on a book project that examines transformationalleaders of the 20th century who made major breakthroughsfor peace and security. in an interview on our blog iasked bruce why this project now?
and his response was thefollowing, "it's a lot easier to name a global problem that'sbeen growing worse than one which progress is being made. there are many aspectsto meeting these and other 21st century challenges,but much must come top-down from global leaders able andwilling to be transformational, to break out of the tunnelvision of thinking narrowly about one's interests andthe myopia of focusing on today but not tomorrow."
we hope that bruce's work willreveal what lessons may exist for us to solve our 21st century problems. a word about the chairposition which bruce holds, the kissinger chair is madepossible by the generous donations of the friends and admirersof dr. henry kissinger. it establishes a nonpartisanfocus in the nation's capital for discussions of key issuesin foreign affairs and acts as a catalyst for the fresh analysis of foreign affairsin this global era.
one distinguished senior scholaris appointed annually to be in residence at the klugecenter, and the research may be on any aspect of foreign policy or international relationsinvolving the united states and using the libraryof congress collections. our past chair holdershave included an ambassador who researched the evolution ofthe relationship between india and the united states, a memberof the british diplomatic service who researched pakistan'sstrategic culture,
and an adjunct senior fellow atthe council on foreign relations who researched the growingdivisions between the eu, nato, and the former soviet union. our 16th kissinger chair will arrivelater this year, and we are eager to hear from you with nominationsfor our 17th kissinger chair. so please visit our website tolearn more about the program, and note that applicationsand nominations for this position may besubmitted through november 1st. and now to introduce dr. jentleson.
as mentioned, dr. jentlesonis the 15th holder of the henry a. kissingerchair in foreign policy and international relations hereat the library's kluge center. bruce is professor of publicpolicy and political science at duke university where hepreviously served as director of the terry sanfordinstitute of public policy. from 2009 to 2011 hewas senior advisor to the u.s. state departmentpolicy planning director. in 2012 he served onthe obama 2012 campaign,
national security advisorysteering committee. he also served as a seniorforeign policy advisor to vice president gore in his2000 presidential campaign, in the clinton administrationstate department, and as a foreign policy aide tosenators gore and david durenberger. he has served on a numberof policy commissions, most recently the responsibilityto protect working group, co-chaired by formersecretary madeleine albright. and his books include"american foreign policy,
the dynamics of choice in the 21stcentury," "the end of arrogance, america in the globalcompetition of ideas," coauthored with steven weber, and "withfriends like these, reagan, bush, and saddam, 1982 to 1990." he has published articles innumerous journals, academic and policy, and for leadingsites such as foreign policy, council on foreignrelations, huffington post, the hill, and washington post. his current book project is"transformational statesmanship,
difficult, possible, necessary,"which is under contract with w.w. norton and is the subject of his work here atthe kluge center. so without further ado, please joinme in welcoming bruce jentleson. [ applause ] >> bruce jentleson:thanks very much, jason. and thanks to the kluge center. i've been here for thefull academic year. it's been a fabulousplace to be and to work.
i particularly want to thank janemcauliffe who was the director of the center during myperiod of application, bob gallucci who was the directorduring my period of residence, and really all my colleagues hereat the kluge center, both present and those earlier inthe academic year. i also want to acknowledge thewilson center where i also worked on this book a couple of years agowhen i was a distinguished scholar, and still am affiliated as anon-resident global fellow. and my various ras who workedon this [inaudible] one
of whom is here today --so thank you very much -- in the years of doing the research. the kissinger chair isreally a great honor. and as part of thisproject i actually got to interview dr. kissingerin january. it's the first time i hadactually had a one-on-one with him, and i had interacted with him ingroups in various times before. in fact, there was one timewhere i was invited to go with a congressional delegationto a conference in germany,
and henry kissinger was part ofthe delegation, along with a number of congressmen and senators who wereflying out of andrews airforce base. and so it was one of these overnightflights, and i said to my wife, i said, "you know, normally i'd justsort of wear like a running suit." she said, "you can't do that. you know, you're going withkissinger and these senators. you've got to like wear, youknow, at least a sport jacket and a tie if not a suit." so i show up at andrews dressedlike this, and who's greeting people
when you get on the plane butkissinger in a running suit, right? you know, of course, he hada compartment on the plane to change into, and so when we cameback, you know, i said to barbara, i said, "you see, you know, kissinger was wearinga running suit." and she said, "yeah,he's henry kissinger. you're bruce jentleson," right, soyou each get to dress accordingly. and so the book, as jason mentioned, will be published next summeror fall by w.w. norton.
the working title -- everybodyknows published books it's really up to your editor what the title is, but this is the titlewe've been using, "transformational statesmanship,difficult, possible, necessary." and it's really a bookthat, as jason said -- and i'll talk some more about it -- about breakthroughs in the20th century for global peace and security, broadly defined. not a book about perfectachievements of peace and security.
indeed, that would be a very shortbook to write, unfortunately. one wouldn't need a full ninemonths of residence to do it. but i realized the other day that this book serves anumber of purposes for me. in fact, this morning i was on apanel at the holocaust museum -- i do a lot of work both as ascholar and in my policy roles on mass atrocities andgenocide prevention. we had a panel with senator bencardin and a number of other people over at the holocaust museum.
and i also have beendoing a lot of work lately in a very immediatesense on issues in syria. and those can be ratherdepressing subjects. this book is a little bitabout hopeful achievements, so i realize that imay not ever finish it, because it's really my mental healththerapy that keeps me thinking about what actually maybe possible in the world. it's interesting, so thisbook actually started with some ideas from my students.
in the early 1980s, toward the end of a u.s. foreign policycourse i taught when i was then on the faculty at theuniversity of california davis, i had asked the studentstheir thoughts on the future. "well, professor jentleson,"one earnest young student said, "i think the cold war will end" -- this is the early 1980s-- "and end peacefully." and from another bright-eyedone i got, "apartheid will end in south africa, and southafrica will transition
to a black-majority democracy." my responses at the timewere along the lines of, "it's nice to be young, naive, and california dreaming,but let's be realistic." the cold war did end, andwithout a nuclear or other u.s. /soviet war. apartheid did end, and the politicaltransition was impressively civil. while many factors came into play, the extraordinary statesmanshipprovided by mikhail gorbachev
and nelson mandelawere the crucial ones. so in one of those gratifyingexamples of the two-way street of professors teaching and alsolearning from students, and teaching and research cross-fertilizing,i got thinking about two other questions. who else in the 20th centurywas a profile in statesmanship, shaping major breakthroughsfor peace? the leaders i include in thebook were not totally successful. gorbachev and mandelawere not, either.
but they were transformational,making breakthroughs on issues that have been marked by deeptensions and intense conflict, which made possible, although didnot guarantee further progress. and secondly, what can we learn from 20th century transformationalstatesmanship for the 21st century? a while back, in the late 1980s,early 1990s, it sure seemed like the world was goingin a good direction. the cold war ended peacefully,dictatorships were falling to democracies, globalizationwas spreading the wealth,
history was said to be over,world affairs becoming so harmonic as to be downright boring. as jason said in our interview, things have not exactlyworked out that way. the end of the cold war hasnot meant the end of war. that democratic wave hasbroken up on some rocky shores. globalization has hadlosers as well as winners, downsides as well as upsides. history has come roaring back
with ancient hatredsfueled by modern venoms. climate change is speeding up. global health pandemicsare spreading. cyberwar and other technology-drivenemerging areas in need of rules of the game aren't getting them. indeed, it is a lot easier to namea global problem that's been growing worse than one in whichprogress has been made. so as i thought about thesetwo questions and started to develop my thinking on it,they really bring you back to one
of those questions that's beendebated forever, you know, does history make statesmenor do statesmen make history? you know, at one end of thedebate is thomas carlyle's heroic conception of history that, quote, "the history of what man hasaccomplished in this world is at bottom the history of thegreat men who have worked here. all thing that we seestanding accomplished in the world are properlythe outer material result -- the practical realizationembodiment of thoughts that dwelt
in the great men sentinto the world." the other end of thedebate is herbert spencer who derided the universallove of personalities, going back well before "people"magazine and tmz.com to when, quote, "round the campfire assembledsavages telling the events of the day's chase, and he amongthem who has done some feat of skill or agility is duly lauded." the truth lies in between. carlyle is too much the romanticist,overstating the roles of individuals
and undervaluing conduciveconditions creating opportunities for leadership. spencer is too much the sociologist,overstating societal processes and contexts, and undervaluingwhat, as many people find, and isaiah berlin said, "atcrucial moments at turning points, individuals and their decisions and acts can determinethe course of history." my perspective, based on experiencein the foreign policy world as well as an international relationsprofessor, puts me in this history
of great leaders' middle ground. the academic literature digs deeperthan just the latest who's up and who's down, but too oftenstays at a level of abstraction that glosses over theimpact that leaders do have. the talk here inside the beltway andamong journalists can get too caught up in personalities,but often does focus in on critical decisionmaking and strategizing. the analytic balance is inrecognizing that history and broad social forcescreate constraints as well
as conducive conditions, shapingthe range of available choices. but they don't determinewhat choices get made. no individual is soextraordinary that he or she would have transformationalimpact, irrespective of the context in which he or sheends up operating. but it's also not a given that justanyone could have pulled off the statesmanship that theparticular leader did. it's man, woman, andmoment, fit, and timing. and so as i've thoughtabout this in the book,
i think of it as a framework of whati call the three cs, the constraints that limit the choices that leadershave, the conducive conditions that help make it possibleto make certain choices, but ultimately reallyabout choices being made. the -- fred greenstein, whowas a noted political scientist at princeton, in his worked talkedin more formal social science terms about actor indispensability,that the leader in question responds significantlydifferently than another leader in the same situation would have.
and greenstein says this isespecially true in situations like transformational statesmanshipwhen, as he puts it, quote, "the more demanding the politicalact, the greater the likelihood that it will be influenced by personal characteristicsof the actor." so yes, there are systemicforces at work at many levels, but choices that are made. another way of thinking about thisis in baseball moneyball terms, right, the statistic ofwins-against-replacement,
which calculates how much oneplayer contributes to team victories over alternative onesat the same position. and one gets into verycomplicated sabermetrics on this. so while there is no neatdiplo-ball statesmanship against replacement leadersabermetric, or sarl, evidence can be marshalled to makethe same point, who the player or statesman is makes a bigdifference, and frankly, it allows me to connect mypassion for baseball and my work in foreign policy, whichat least two people
in the audience willknow is something i try to do as often as possible. so we can think about this inthe broader sense of leadership as genus leadership,species statesmanship. and there is a hugeliterature on this. james macgregor burns, verydistinguished scholar on this, called leadership, "oneof the most observed and least understoodphenomena on earth." noted author and public intellectualwalter isaacson calls it an
"elusive quality." that's not for a lack of trying. books abound. some are about political leadership,some about business leadership, some philosophical, some how-to. and an amazon searchbrought up 173,164 books for keyword leadership, 79,455for political leadership. nor are there a shortage of university-basedleadership programs.
harvard has its advancedleadership institute. at duke we have ourhard leadership program. the university of virginia hasthe batten school of leadership and public policy, and many others. in the corporate world anestimated $14 billion has been spent over the past two decades on leadership development,twice as much as before. yet 75% of respondents deemtheir programs ineffective. indeed, as we know in many context,
people talk about leadership allthe time, but with the same mantra of we need leadership,and how do you get it? and there's a sense of bothfascination and frustration. fascination in how time and againexplanations of success and failure in such a range ofprofessions and pursuits hone in on leadership as a key factor. frustration in how difficult it isto find the elements of leadership with any degree of consistency,let alone teach and cultivate them. my intent in this book is to tapthe fascination and at least try
to reduce the frustration. so in working with this literatureon leadership broadly defined, i've derived and i use in the booka four-part analytic framework which has the who, why,how, what questions. who were these leadersas individuals? why did the make thecrucial choices they did? how did they pursue their goals? and what was and wasn't achieved? let me talk a little bit aboutthat framework before getting
into the profiles of whoi focus on in the book. here we kind of want to get toknow them a little bit as people without putting them onthe couch and doing sort of a deterministic,psychoanalytic analysis. "a man's rootage [sic]," aswoodrow wilson once said, "means more than his leafage." but it's not aboutbeing a born leader. rarely is there a statesmanshipequivalent of mozart the five-year-oldprodigy or lebron james
with nba superstar skills coming outof high school, or a perfect person, nelson mandela in hisown personal life was -- issues with his own family,with is wives and his children. there are, though, somecertain personal qualities that do bear heavilyon leadership capacity. one is what is called by somein the literature moral capital, which is a little differentthan political capital. it's a justness of what you standfor, and of you as the leader of that cause and for that purpose.
and so legitimacy isperceived by those to whom you would providethe leadership. one of the factors that goesinto this is personal courage, the sacrifices endured,the hardships suffered, in many cases prisonsentences, the willingness to take courageous stands. as two scholars on leadershipat harvard put it, they said, "transformational leadershipis not a safe path. it is indeed a dangerous activity.
you appear dangerous to peoplewhen you question their values, beliefs, or habits of a lifetime. you place yourself on the linewhen you tell people what they need to hear rather thanwhat they want to hear." gorbachev got killedpolitically, some of the others in the book got assassinated. charisma is an interesting quality, which is sort of whatpeople always point to, sort of the john kennedy charisma.
but -- and again, i'll talk someabout this now, and i'm happy to go into more detail whenwe have discussion -- in some ways it's backward. i mean, nelson mandela is the iconiccase of a charismatic personality. but to jump ahead a littlebit, one of the people in the book is yitzhak rabin whohardly fit the kennedy image, this gruff old grandfatherlyguy who wasn't very good at being -- giving speeches. i was in israel about threeweeks after his assassination,
and i wasn't surprisedby friends and colleagues who were all broken up about this. but when i went down to thesquare where he had been killed and i saw 16-year-olds lightingcandles and playing guitars for this gruff old guy who didn'thave kennedy-esque charisma, it really affected meeven more profoundly than my own friends and colleagues. and so some ways charisma is aproduct, and ultimately you see it, but it's not the kindof thing that, you know,
sort of consultantsand others look for. we also get into somenegative qualities, because the point here isadmiration, but not hero worship. and the point being manyimperfect people can be very effective statesmen. political skills of a varietyof kind also were important in terms of these two profiles. why really gets into thevision, why did these and others develop their guidingvisions beyond the way the world is
to how it could be? being able and willing topush beyond standard analysis and see the need forprofound change was a key. what was the basis for that insight? i looked for turningpoints, decisive moments when key choices weremade, and ideas and strategies started to develop. a vision is really astory, a political one. it's akin in form and functionsto what we think of more broadly
as narratives that provide thewhy for the transformation. and while it variesin different cases, you'll find that italways has three elements. there's a normative element, the values which thepresent is violating and the alternative futurewill affirm; the symbolic, tapping deeply-rootedcultural beliefs and mores, and avoiding taboos that infusejudgments of the legitimacy of the vision; and a cognitiveelement, the key substantive points,
and the critique, andthe alternative. how is really a questionof politics and strategy, what joe nye in hiswork on this quotes, "the means to achieve theends in one's vision." robert rotberg, who'swritten a lot on leaders in the developing worldsays leaders -- transformational leaderscan't just be visionaries. they have to be navigators. nan keohane, president of duke formany years and a political theorist
in her own right, talks about notjust making decisions, but devising and implementing strategies withthe right combination of incentives. heifetz and lipsky at harvard talkabout controlling the temperature, keeping the opposition close. and in deed, in thestories that i tell, when these have been violated italso points to ways in which some of these leaders have notachieved the full transformations that they've wanted. the what did and what didn't theyachieve, to quote machiavelli,
"there is nothing more difficultto carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor moredangerous to handle than to initiate anew order of things. and here i take thetransformational balance sheet, and sort of net assessing ineach case what was lessons and what was and wasn't achieved. recall that isaiah berlin quote inwhich he talked about individuals that can determine the course ofhistory, not necessarily they do, which comes back to thethree cs, constraints,
conducive conditions, and choices. breakthroughs also have backlashes. and here it's important todraw the lessons, as i said, between what was achievedand what wasn't. so that's the [inaudible] framework. quickly sort of the criteriafor choosing the cases in terms of the research design, ifocus on 20th century cases, which is really moremy own expertise than prior historical periods ina sense of what's most pertinent
for 21st century lesson drawing. transformational statesmanshipand the work of people like janet berger burns[assumed spelling] and joe nye is distinguishedfrom transactional diplomacy. transformational being effortsto make major breakthroughs in global peace and security asdistinct from diplomacy geared to managing and resolving issuesin the normal course of events, which is not to belittle importanceof transactional diplomacy. it's very important on a day-to-daybasis, but it's just not my focus
in this particular book, tryingto look at those breakpoints. third is the impact had, notso much the position held. typically when we think ofstatesmanship we turn to presidents and prime ministers, secretaries ofstate, ministers of foreign affairs, and other leaders of nation-states. while i emphasize nationalleaders, i'm also inclusive of transformational leadersfor international institutions, from social movements andngos who did for peace and justice what governmentswere unable or unwilling to do.
this is the sense ofstatesmanship less strictly in terms of the position held than the impacthad on global peace and security. twentieth century breakthroughs,21st century lessons based on these profiles, notso much to point at this or that leader floatingaround the 21st century world. indeed, if someone triedto do that with many of the 20th century profiles,we would miss quite a few. but drawing lessonsfor different areas, for overcoming the difficulties,maximizing the possibilities,
and achieving what is necessary. and when i think aboutglobal peace and security, it's a rather large subject. to get a handle on it, i break itdown into five different dimensions, and then i choose representativecases for each of these areas, by no means the claimof being comprehensive. five dimensions aremajor power geopolitics, managing major power relations forcooperation more than conflict; building internationalinstitutions for conflict prevention
and collective action; fosteringreconciliation of peoples who have been looked in conflictsrooted in historical hatreds; advancing freedom andprotecting human rights; and promoting sustainability,including poverty and equality reduction,environmental protection, and global public health. as i said, i look atrepresentative examples. in fact, you know, maybe when we publish we willdevelop a social media game
of who people would nominate intheir own sort of set of leaders. but i choose at least leaders that i think really representimportant breakthroughs. okay, so who are they? i'm going to run throughthem really quickly, and then i'll say alittle bit about each ones. terms of major powergeopolitics, the two cases i focus on are henry kissingerand zhou enlai -- and i had this focus before i gotthe chair -- and the opening of --
between the united states and china in the early 1970s,and mikhail gorbachev. for building internationalinstitutions, little bit on wilson actuallyin a way that i didn't expect to be talking about wilson,fdr, and particularly focus on dag hammarskjold, the mosteffective secretary general in the history of theunited nations. and again, that was before knowing that our swedish colleagueswere coming.
reconciliation of peoples, thecases here are nelson mandela, anwar sadat, yitzhak rabin, and thenorthern ireland women for peace, betty williams and mairead corrigan. freedom and human rights --and i'll go through each one, explain the basis forchoosing them -- gandhi, the founder ofamnesty international, a british lawyer namedpeter benenson, lech walesa, vaclav havel, aung san suu kyi. and for sustainabilitygro harlem brundtland,
the former prime ministerof norway, al gore and the intergovernmentalpanel on climate change, and the gates foundation. let me give you a little bit of anexplanation of the choice for them and a little bit of whati see coming out of them. but i'm going to be very briefin some of these remarks in order to leave some time forquestions and discussion. the opening to china wasreally kissinger's best. it entailed realpolitikstrategizing,
or great power politics. it required the face-to-facediplomacy that his persona so well suited. it worked through back channels andsecret meetings as was his want. it maneuvered the superpowertriangle in ways that reinforced sovietincentives for detente. zhou enlai was verymuch the equal partner. he was that extraordinary mixof committed revolutionary, pragmatic diplomat, and whatsome would call the last mandarin
bureaucrat in the confuciantradition. had las vegas bookies known about the secret kissinger-zhoumeetings representing two countries that have been enemiesfor 20-plus years, that regularly demonized oneanother politically and culturally, that had burning issues like u.s.support for taiwan and chinese aid to north vietnam, no doubt thebetting odds would have been on breakdown. one of the keys was makingthe transactional serve
the transformational. compromising on issueslike taiwan and vietnam, conscious of the larger strategicstakes, recognizing that, as zhou put it, "only the settlement of fundamental questionsfirst can lead to the settlement ofother questions." and i think that's a verysignificant statement that relates to any number of issues onecan think about today, u.s. /russia, u.s.
/china, perhaps u.s. /iran, only the settlement offundamental questions that can lead to the settlement ofother questions. it's true there are otherplayers in this, president nixon and chairman mao were ofcourse also major players, and they did get the opera. but kissinger and zhou werethe statecraft strategists. gorbachev made the key decisionto bring the cold war to an end. and while he gets thebulk of the credit,
some also goes to ronald reagan. it wasn't as essentially equala role as kissinger and zhou, so i do bring reaganinto the analysis more than some, less than others. i focus the profileprincipally on gorbachev. as bad as things were for thesoviet union, the afghanistan war, the economy, restiveness all overeastern europe, it wasn't a given that another soviet leaderwould have made the decisions that gorbachev did, thusthe statesmanship moneyball.
while gorbachev acknowledgeshis own leadership failures, as he says in his memoirs, quote,"looking back, on can see blemishes and mistakes that could havebeen avoided," and while he ended up eliminated from the russianpolitical scene, his impact endured. the cold war ended. it ended peacefully. and vladimir putin notwithstanding,today's tensions are nothing like the competition betweennuclear arms superpowers with global ambitionsand competing ideologies
that largely define the world scene for the second halfof the 20th century. so when you hear peopletalking about the new cold war, i think what we'reseeing is a major power -- a classical major power competition between the unitedstates and russia. but we shouldn't forget whatthe cold war was really about. and so my argument is thatendured despite the current state of relations.
for a while, of course, itseemed like the great game of major politics mightbe a thing of the past. russian and americanleaders were embracing, bill clinton and boris yeltsin. peering into each other's eyesand getting a sense of his soul, george w. bush after hisfirst meeting with putin. declaring a reset to getrelations back on track, barrack obama and dmitry medvedev. the interweaving of china intothe global economy was supposed
to temper its rise. the united states claimed to beplaying its leadership role in ways that were in the interest of theoverall international community. but again, it hasn'tworked out that way. russia has been more aggressivethan at any time since the cold war; china has been flexingits muscles in asia; and the bush administration wentto war in iraq over the opposition of much of the world;the expectation that greeted barrack obamathat all will be fine
with a more multilateralistamerican president was not met in any enduring way over thecourse of his presidency. and what comes nextin the united states? separate conversation [chuckle]. but as we try to get u.s. /russia/china relations on a bettertrack, there are a number of lessons that i try to draw out fromthe kissinger/zhou relationship and the gorbachev breakthrough. building international institutions,when i was first thinking
about the book i really had wilsonvery much in mind for the main focus of international institutions,you know, making the world safe for democracy, internationalcooperation through new league of nations, wilsonianism asan enduring school of thought. but the more i dug into the reading,much of which i actually did at the wilson center on thispart, in research about wilson, the more the limits of histransformationalism became apparent. the standard view that americanswere just bent on retreating into isolationism after the greatwar is actually much too knee-jerk.
when you look at actuallythe politics of the moment, wilson could have gottenthe versailles treaty and u.s. league membership ratified, but he hugely mismanagedthe domestic politics. and for all his high-mindedness, the design of the leaguewas fundamentally flawed. so it's the limits of wilson'stransformational statesmanship that's instructive and that i useas sort of an initial mini-profile. fdr as the principle architect
of the u.n. succeededwhere wilson didn't. while designing an internationalinstitution is its own active statesmanship, his untimelydeath meant that he never got to play a direct role inbringing it to fruition. had he lived, his imprint on theu.n. may have been even greater. another we'll-never-knowis whether fdr's musings about resigning the presidencyand taking up the leadership of the u.n. would have come to pass. as things turned out, the firstu.n. secretary general, trygve lie,
had such a difficult time in theposition that he left, calling it, quote, "the most impossiblejob in the world." lie's successor dag hammarskjoldwould prove differently. and he more than any otherleader showed how impactful an international institutionthe united nations could be. he made the position a genuineleadership one, a secular pope, as he and others called it, and showed what theu.n. could contribute to building globalpeace and security.
this comes throughin his overall effort to strengthen the u.n.institutionally, guided by a conception of theinternational public servant, and especially in his handlingof three crises that i focus on in the book, american/korean warpows held by the people's republic of china in 1954, the1956 suez crisis spurred by the british/french/israelinvasion of egypt, and the 1960-61 congo crisis. at a time in which the worldneeds a more effective u.n. --
other internationalinstitutions as well, but the u.n. having the most bearingon global peace and security -- there is much to be learnedfrom someone who was eulogized by u.s. ambassador to the u.n.adlai stevenson as, quote, "a brilliant mind, a braveand compassionate spirit. i doubt if any living man hasdone more to further the search for a world in which men solve theirproblems by peaceful means and not by force than thisgallant friend of us all." the final part of this chapter laysout what i call the job description
for a 21st centuryhammarskjoldian secretary general. while this is not the only elementof making the u.n. more effective, and while a more effective u.n.is not the only international institutional reform needed, amore effective u.n. won't happen without a secretary generalwith the statesmanship qualities hammarskjold had. and without an effective u.n., other internationalinstitutional reforms won't suffice. so the way i'm doing this is i'mwriting a variety of offshoots.
i'm writing an article this summerfor more of a policy journal as we go into this search fora new u.n. secretary general in which there is much emphasison gender and geography, and appropriately, but making theargument about why it's really about the job description. and i'm going to do that witha lot of pieces of this to sort of get pieces out alongthe way to the book. but i think as we movetoward september when i think this decision getsmade, there's enormous lessons
in the role that hammarskjoldplayed. mandela, of course,is the iconic case of reconciliation among peoples,leading the fight to end apartheid through peaceful means, and theglobal icon that he embodied. the dignity with which heendured his nearly three decades as a political prisoner inspiredso many people around the world, as well as in his own country. his commitment to reconciliationfathered the rebirth of his own nation and presented theworld with a very different model
from those seekingretribution and revenge. his moral capacity to differentiatebetween hatred of the system and hatred of whites wasa statesmanship contrast to the demagogic leadersin so many other parts of the world fomentingidentity-based killings. for sadat, who had built iscareer quite conventionally through the egyptian military andwas generally seen as a placeholder until a stronger successorto gamal abdel nasser rose, it was a long and surprisingjourney.
it ended with an assassin'sbullet, but before then along with u.s. president jimmy carter and israeli prime ministermenachem begin -- who again are prat of the story,but not the crucial focus -- he forged the first pieceof arab/israeli peace. and so, too, with rabin who hadbeen the top military commander in the 1967 war that hadconquered the west bank and other arab territories. and as defense minister during the1987 palestinian intifada allegedly
[inaudible] of breaking bones,became the prime minister who in 1993 shook hands withplo leader yasser arafat and signed a series of peaceagreements until he, too, was struck down by an assassin. true, the pieces of peacethey laid were partial, but without them there would beeven less chance of ever getting to a full israeli peace --full arab/israeli peace. and in the spirit of theimpact held, not just the -- impact had, not just positionheld, i'm trying to bring in others
to demonstrate how in thisparticular case of northern ireland, betty williams and mairead corrigan who in 1976 founded the northernireland women of peace at the height of the violence of thetroubles as everyday people who in their own ways demonstratedtransformational statesmanship. the troubles had takenthe death toll from about 16 in 1969to 500 by 1972. and while there was never onlyone factor, these two women and the organization they formedgot a great deal of credit
for the steep decline to111 in 1977, 82 in 1978, and never reachingthose levels again. they inspired peopleto speak up, stand up, and turn out against the violence. they catalyzed outragefrom the people in whose names the violencewas being perpetrated, yet who were paying the price,protestants and catholics together to a greater extentthan ever before. not a full resolutionof the conflict,
but a seminal breakthrough. indeed, george mitchell,the principle negotiator of the 1998 good friday agreement,would later write the foreword for a book about corriganand williams, recognizing their contribution towhat ultimately became the agreement that he helped negotiate. these politics of identity,which we were talking about at the holocaustmuseum this morning, who i am versus who you are,are even more prevalent today
than in the 20th century. they have been muchmore the continuation than the end of history. but history shapes,it does not determine. when demagogic leaders --political leaders intentionally fuel identity-based conflicts, hatredsbecome all the more visceral, the killing wanted and massive. when statesmen like sadat, rabin,and mandela and everyday people like corrigan and williamsprovide more positive leadership,
reconciliation is possible. and i draw lessons here for ourera's identity-based conflicts in the middle east,africa, and elsewhere. in terms of freedomand human rights -- and i'm going to run through thisquickly so we can have some time to discuss -- if you think aboutthe 20th century freedom agenda, there are three main elements. one was decolonization andindependence, and here i use gandhi as the principle profile forhis nationalism and passivism
that not only shaped india,but resonated globally as the world transitioned from theimperial age to post-colonialism. it had democratizationboth from communist rule and soviet imperial control. and here there is similaritiesand contrasts between walesa and vaclav havel thatare very interesting. and also, by the way, inthe spirit of imperfections, there are more positives about therole of leaders of the liberation, and less so in terms of theroles they played once they
became president. and also democratizationin terms of freeing from military [inaudible]dictatorship. and here i include aung san suukyi for her courageous defiance of the burma military dictatorship. and again, this is anabsolutely fascinating case, because those of you who havebeen following burma now know that while she's playedthis extraordinary role in bringing back democracy toburma, there is this huge issue
of the rohingya muslim minority inburma which is -- there are 135 -- 136 minorities in burma,135 are recognized. they don't have other rights,but the rohingya are not even yet granted statusas state citizens, and they've been persecutedby the previous governments. and so the question of what herpolicy would be remains uncertain. she is now counselor,quasi-president. and so far -- i mean, just this oneexample that happened the other day, the american ambassador to burmamade a statement of condolence
for these rohingya familiesthat had drowned at sea on these makeshift boats, simply acondolence, and she called him in and told him that he reallycouldn't use that word, because they were not arecognized state minority. so as i write the book i'mtrying to bring out the tensions in these breakthroughs, and again,away from the perfect people. and you know, i'vegot four or five -- i've got a few more months topublication to see where this goes. and the great debate iswhether or not she is sort
of doing a walk-before-you-run,you know, trying to keep the militarycontained and will ultimately move to this core set of values, orwhether her advocacy of freedom and human rights really pertainmore to political prisoners. and the other profile is thefounder of amnesty international, a british lawyer namedpeter benenson. and i include them because amnestyinternational really launched the contemporary human rights movement. benenson himself wasa bit of an odd duck.
he was actually kicked out ofamnesty international about five or six years after he founded it. but i think it's veryimportant, and what i try to get out here is this lead rolefor social movements, ngos, and other unofficial groups,which is increasingly a part of our 21st century world thatwe see even in the 20th century. and here starting withthe amnesty international, which opened up the door to humanrights watch, humanity united, all these other groups that are verymuch a part, i think, of the efforts
to make transformations on humanrights in the 21st century. last category is sustainabledevelopment. it was only in the late 20th centurythat sustainability finally started to be recognized as a priority. gro harlem brundtland, who isthree-time prime minister of norway, is really includedprincipally for her work in the international arena firstas chairwoman in the early -- in the 1980s for the worldcommission on environment and development, which coinedthe term sustainable development.
and then as director general of thewho, the world health organization, 1998 to 2003, in which she sortof rescued it from a period of corruption and inefficacyand brought it back -- something that hasn't that -- asmuch continued by her successors. but one of the things she did washe made health an integral component of four of the eight unitednations millennium development goals that had guided policyfrom 2000 to 2015 for the overall globalantipoverty agenda. and so i talk here,too, about the role
of another internationalinstitution, and her particular role and the leadership that she providedthat i think was quite unique. on the environment -- and as jasonsaid, you know, transparency here, i for many years worked in avariety of capacities for senator and vice president al gore as oneof his former policy advisors. i did not work on climate changeother than when he first started out being, asked to holdup these giant posters until he got his appleslideshow going. but i think that gore representsan interesting case both
in his political successesand failures, with lessons from bothto be carried forward. and i think i try to drawthose out, where he succeeded in making it an issue, and where hedidn't during his political career, and then the careerthat has come after. the ipcc is also includedboth for its particular work on global environmental issuesand as an example of the role of multilateral independentexpert commissions. the gates foundation iinclude for similar reasons
as the amnesty international,both for what it's done, but for this broader notion ofsocial entrepreneurship in this area of sustainability asplaying a crucial role. it's also the casethat is with said back in 2005 before our world healthorganization meeting in geneva, a swiss newspaper ran the headline, "the health of the world dependsmore on bill gates than on the who." though in exaggeration, itmade a point about the role of the gates foundation andmore broadly about ngo's
and social entrepreneursand issues of global health and other aspects of sustainability. in his very powerfulbook, collapse , how societies chooseto fail or succeed. jared diamond posesthe star question about how could a societyfail to have seen the dangers that seem so clear in retrospect? then he talks abouteaster island and others. he also says, "globalization makesit impossible for modern societies
to collapse in isolation." you know, so we think aboutsecurity, we put much emphasis duly on things like weapons of massdestruction and a variety of things. but i think we also live in aworld in which climate change and these other issues,sustainability, are not something out in the future, butthey're very much here today. there was an article inthe paper the other day; it was called the "first climaterefugees in the united states." and so i'm trying toget at this issue
as an increasingly important issue. so i'm going to stop there,hopefully giving you an overview of the book and how i'm bothusing the cases and trying to draw out the profiles. let me just close by going back to john kennedy's profilesin courage . it was about american politics,not world affairs, u.s. senators, not world leaders, but inrereading profiles in courage , i was struck by the concernthat today, that is 1956 quote,
"the challenge of politicalcourage ludes -- looms larger than ever before. for our everyday life is becomingso saturated," this is 1956, "with a tremendous powerof mass communications. our political life has becomeso expensive, so mechanized and so dominated byprofessional politicians and public relations men,that the idealists who dream of independent statesmanship isrudely awakened by the necessities of election and accomplishment."
many say that if he thought it washard then, he should see what it's like in our 21st century mediaenvironment with the logs and the iphone cameras andsocial media, cable tv, multibillion dollarpolitical campaigns, etcetera. indeed there's been spadeof books telling us, quote, "historical greatness in the american presidencyhas gone the way of the dodo." it is quote, "the end of powerfrom boardrooms to battlefields and churches to states, thatit's the end of leadership,
that we're just sendingin the global anarchy." there's a little bit too much woeis us-ism for my taste in this. the problem of bold leadership hasalways been there in every era, in every area of societal life,in every country internationally. transformational statesmanshipis difficult, we've seen that, but it's possible we'vealso seen that. if we're to meet the challengesof the global peace, security and justice here in the 21stcentury, it is necessary. standard statesmanshipjust won't fill the bill;
it can't just be all transactional. and my goal in this book isto show what has been possible when thought impossible in the20th century and to propose ideas and strategies for ourcurrent global agenda, to help get from how the worldis to how it can and needs to be. thanks very much. so, jason has a microphoneand welcome questions and comments from anyone. >> let me first say that i findit to be a very incredible,
interesting summing upof very complex issues. i'm not from this spot of the world,i'm from the caribbean, so you know, i studied in netherlands, america,but i'm from the caribbean, so i'm just saying thatso that you understand where i'm coming fromtoo [inaudible]. you know, some of the peopleyou are summing up here, i mean, they are big and important people. you talk about al goreand the ipcc, i mean, i'm wondering about jimmycarter and his -- his role.
i mean, he's playeda tremendous role. i mean, to a certain extent,i think an even more important than al gore, but be that as it may. and what i see is thatreally much more kind of radically leadersfrom the third world. i'm talking -- i mean, this is ahuge problem, but what is happening in cuba now, obviously, [inaudible]or, i mean, whatever one might think of as undertaking of trying tocome up with a different way to integrate the caribbean in a muchmore independent way [inaudible]
united states of america, right,which i mean, what's happening in venezuela, whathappening bolivia, a lot of these differentplaces, it is run to ground. in the caribbean aremuch more positive one, or maybe somewhat less controversial[inaudible] to a certain extent, still controversial wouldbe the leader of jamaica. now, i forgot his name, in1980's -- what's his name? [ inaudible speaker ] -- right, right, you know?
i was in netherlandsthere, i was a law student at university [inaudible] thosedays and i remember going to england and everybody wouldcome and hug me and say, "you guys have the spokesmanfor the third world, right." so, i was wondering, i mean, a lotof this takes place in kind of, you know, liberal internationalism,etcetera, etcetera. but what do you see of the otherattempts by other leaders, right, to as the world change and as the -- as the power in the worldclearly shifts away --
start to shift away from theunited states of america. >> bruce jentleson: right. >> how do you see and potentially, how do you see theseother leaders trying to be transformation leadersin this new [inaudible]. >> bruce jentleson: so, ithink your comments point to my -- two things i said. one is i -- i, you know, i've triedto choose representative examples of each type, not necessarilycomprehensive.
and secondly, the great social mediagame that can come out of this. i've given a couple talks inthese other places and, you know, people always have theirown lists and stuff. and, i mean, i can makearguments about some of the people you mentioned,pros and cons, you know, that sort of way. but i think -- but the last pointis what i really want to focus on, which in the last chapter, youknow, i talk about the shifts. when you look at the 20th centuryand you look at breakthroughs
for global peace and security,it tended to be very western because of the natureof the system in power. i think what's interesting aboutthe 21st century and i've written on this in other places,what i call the pluralization of diplomacy, right. indeed even in my undergraduatedays at cornell, there was a great course calledastronomy for nonmajors taught by a not -- a guy who wasn'tyet famous called carl sagan. and so i always loved theseastronomy metaphors and if talked
about how to a certainextent, the cold war was a era like [inaudible] era, youknow, [inaudible] had the earth at the center and everythingrevolved around it. [inaudible] the u.s. saw itselfat the center of that world, ideologically, economically,military. copernican comes along manycenturies later and says, "actually, every planet has its own orbit and there's something calledthe sun in the middle." i think the 21st centuryis a copernican world,
you have many countriesthat have a sense of what their interestpriorities and choices are. and i think what we'll see, youknow, over the next decades is -- is more of these kind of initiativesthat broadly effect global peace and security comingfrom nonwestern leaders. in fact, it's my hope. but, you know, empiricallylooking at the 20th century, it tends to tilt in that direction. so, yeah i mean, there could beplenty of discussions and debates
about choices and there'ssome people, you know, that i haven't includedbecause, you know, i'm under -- you know, it's got tobe a certain length for my publisher and everything. but -- but that's really wherean interesting question is. and part of my goal in writingthe book whether it's for people in scholarly circles or peoplein book clubs, you know, to have these kind of discussions. who would you put inthose categories?
>> hi, thank you somuch for your talk. so, i'm a history major,so i probably have like 20 different questions foryou, but i'll limit myself to one. i really appreciatedthat you ended talking about climate change refugees. and one thing i was actually,like a couple days ago, just reading the unhcr sort ofstipulations for how we should like treat climate change refugees. but then, it makes youwonder, so all of those ngo's,
all of these things, like the un andhuman rights council, everything -- to what extent do ngo's thatwere created in the 20th century, now in the 21st century, justserve to sort of like benevolently like sort of perpetuate thestatus quo where the west is sort of controlling things,creating stipulations, creating sort of ourdefinition for what rights are, for what is a refugee,what isn't a refugee, how should they betreated, etcetera. and so, like i guesswith that considered,
like how is that then amodel for a more just world? >> bruce jentleson: yeah, ithink -- i think, you know, ngo's is a large category and wheni teach my course at the university on globalization and governance,i try to give the students of a couple cases of ngo's as "badguys" and companies as good guys because everybody, you know, usuallyassumes the opposite of them. just to sort of mix it up. so, there's no question thatthere's differences in ngo's. the climate changeissue to me, you know,
when i talked about the three c's-- conducive conditions, constraints and choices, it isso ripe for some -- various kinds of leadershipstatesmanship. i mean, here you have theprivate sector, you know, if you're an insurance companyand you own hotels on miami beach, you know, you're actuallyreally beginning to think that climate change mightbe a problem, right. so there -- there's a shift from theclassical, and that's where i try to talk about with[inaudible] and gore and the ipc
from the binary zero sum, you'reeither for the economic or for not. but it hasn't gone far enough --i mean, even the paris agreement, you know, is not really keeping upwith the pace of climate change. so -- so what i'm goingto, you know, try to say, that you have a lot ofconditions there, you know -- you know, pope francis has spokento it now, that it's really ripe because you have moreconducive conditions i think in fewer constraints. i know there are some people thatstill deny that it's happening,
but that's another subject. but i'm just talkingabout things happening and there are different issues here,you know, if you're in micronesia, you know, it -- i mean,talk about climate refugee. so -- so, i guess i would say,i'm not trying to glorify ngo, i'm trying to say how they'repart of the statesmanship mix in the 21st century and then peoplewill make judgments and analysis about where they thinktheir playing, you know, [inaudible] a positiverole and we're not.
>> thank you. firstly, just to say thank you somuch for your amazing insights. i very much look forwardto reading the book. i represent the europeanunion, which is a set of [inaudible] institutions whichwas awarded the nobel peace prize in 2012 in recognition of sixdecades of peace on a continent that had had two fairly nasty wars at the first half ofthe 20th century. that's the breakthrough.
the challenges we'refacing in the 21st century, i think are fairly self-evident, we don't need to talkabout them too much. but just be really interestedin your assessment of the role of the likes of jean monnet,robert schuman, konrad adenauer. and you can -- the list goes onand on and on, but some of those. >> bruce jentleson: yeah,i actually -- i've -- i at one point had monnetand the whole group, adenauer, schuman in the book.
and i've been wrestling withthat, actually i've done a lot of the research on it andi've been wrestling with it. and i don't like to be toonewspapery, headliney, you know, about [inaudible] refugees,euro, etcetera. so i'm still wrestling withthat because i do believe it, because i tried to -- you know,my own sense is that in -- in the 21st century world,regional organizations are extremely important, african union hasbeen very important [inaudible] in africa, [inaudible] and asia, andthat the eu is really the -- the --
yeah, i mean, you know,blaze the trail. and as you said, and we americansdon't give enough attention to, stopping major power wars after -- over a century of them in europewas really a big deal, right. whatever else is happening-- so you're exactly right, i've been wrestling with that andtrying to decide whether or not to put it back in and saythe same kind of thing. whatever else has happened sincethen or happens in the future, this was really a big deal.
so you -- you -- younailed me on that one and i'm still mulling itover, hearing you raise that maybe be a reason to, you know,try to put it back in, so yeah. >> thank you, sir. do you think that detante,if it would have continued, could have had the same resultsthat reagan got in the 80's, in terms of soviet -- thefall of the soviet union? >> bruce jentleson: doi think what, i'm sorry? >> do you think detente, if itwould have continued in the 70's,
could've achieved the same resultsthat reagan got in the 1980's? >> bruce jentleson: i thinkdetente collapsed before -- before reagan's election, imean, i think detente collapsed because of policies on both sidesand a whole variety of things. and i think that the, you know, onthe soviet side and the u.s. side and i think some waysdetente was put together that created expectations on both -- on both sides that more hadbeen worked out than before. i think that in the gorbachev era,there are many who argue that,
you know, gorbachev had no choice, it was all about starwars, etcetera. and i go into some detailin the book, you know, making the case why there wereplenty of choices that he had. they might not havebeen good choices, but he had plenty of choices. he could've, you know, sentthe military into poland just like they did in prague in1968 and hungary in 1956. and there were unusual aspects,you know, of him as a leader.
and reagan, second term reagan,much to the chagrin of some of his own hawks, you know,developed this partnership, you know, with gorbachev. and so there is some credit to begiven there even though, you know, on the liberal side peopledon't always acknowledge that. now there's a -- there's a,sort of a hero worship of reagan on the other side says it was allabout reagan and if we hadn't, you know, pushed them [inaudible]have it, so i really do focus a lot on gorbachev, but bring -- andi bring de klerk a little bit
into the story of mandela, but hedoesn't really in my, you know, my diplo-ball -- i make an argument that i think other south africanleaders would have made the same choices that de klerk did. and -- and that reagan wasn't as unique whereas gorbachevand mandela were unique. but i think detente collapsedfor some of its own, you know, own internal problemsand contradictions. by 1980, between the, you know --
you know, issues on[inaudible] afghanistan, issues in the third world where bothof us, you know, were still prepared to look for -- for unilateraladvantages in the third world. those were contradictions neverworked out by detente, so. >> thank you very muchfor your wonderful talk. i wanted to ask a questionabout a subset of your cases because when i think ofstatesmanship, i think of statesman who hold the risk of thesurvivability of their populations at stake and the horrible choicesinvolved at -- on the cusp of war,
for example, where theyhave to risk everything. so fdr and gorbachev, people whorise above and take major risk and the consequences are sohuge, are almost a case apart. and i was wondering if you couldtalk a little bit about what in your research hascome up about the -- the character of thosevisionaries that allow them to overcome that huge hump. and when we look back at somebodylike sir edward grey at the cusp of world war i, in the julycrisis, he seemed to stall out.
and he could have beenthere except for what? what are those character traitsin your view of the people who take the huge risks,like the gorbachev? >> bruce jentleson: it's agreat -- it's a great question, and i you know, in that -- it's a great question inthat who/why framework. so i actually start with thewhy part, i mean, you know, you see this progressionof a vision. i mean, rabin is a goodexample, right, here was somebody
who was a general and whocame to the realization that there was no guarantee thatpeace would bring israel security, but israel could have -- neverhave security without peace. and he got there throughexperience -- and so some of thequalities that people have like that gorbachev had them too,some others did, mandela had it. i mean, really, you know,we take it for granted, 27 years politicalprisoner and you come out thinking reconciliation, right.
so there was an ability to havea sense of society, you know, that understood the other sidewas receptive in some ways to without totally accepting, but receptive to thenarrative of the other side. a little bit of a flexibility ofmind and, you know, and so the -- and sort of this -- this -- and thenthis moral capital that gave them, you know, the standingto make the case. and when they didn't fully succeedon that, you know, with the -- particularly the symbolicparts, you know,
like gorbachev, it brings you down. and the political skills -- andthe political skills they try to trace earlier in their careers,you know, some of it is, you know, the ability to build coalitions andcertain kinds of leadership skills. so there's no one model, butthere's a general sense, you know, you get into some of thisliterature and it's almost like there's a template and sort of the good news is we're notwaiting for the perfect person. if there were really opportunities[inaudible] issues whether it's
climate change or others, forall sorts of pp to step forward, you know, so i mean, actuallyi'm probably going to talk about the pope in the last chapter, because what he's had isa deeply held spiritually, but vision of commonalityin many respects, right. and that can come froma lot of places. and so that's really an importantquality, but you find this in different combinations,you know, sort of a -- there's not a rigidity of thinking.
there's a certain receptivityto, you know, new information and there's an abilityto question your premises when you see a need toquestion a premises. and those are somewhat generic,which is the good news i think, you know, but they're not toogeneral, but they're somewhat, you know, they're not -- they'renot the labron james or the mozart, you know, you findsomebody out there and, you know, that's the person, so. >> why don't we take one more.
>> bruce jentleson: okay. >> this man, gentlemanright here in the back. >> you talk about globalpeace and security, but it seems to be your casesare somewhat light on people who have done the simple thing,the most obvious thing about peace which is stop beingan armed conflict. is there any reason -- am i readingthat right, is there any reason for that, that they're notterribly well presented? >> bruce jentleson: well, youknow, the northern ireland case
in some ways tries to get atthat as an example of people who, you know -- one was a secretaryat the guinness brewery, right, who were just everyday people and they had this personalexperience with it. and they, you know, sort ofwoman in moment in that case, they came out at a point wherenorthern ireland, you know, had really sort of their hands up. some ways the human rightscommunity, i think to the extent that it's been involved in that.
they're probably some peace movementones, john, that i could think of that might be interestingto include. you know, we thought abouthaving sort of a appendix of lots of other cases that might bringin, you know, without [inaudible]. but i'd be interestedto talk with you more about ones you might --you might think about. i mean, you know, you could talkabout the nuclear freeze movement of the 1980's, but -- but i don'tthink it made its breakthrough, you know?
>> but that didn't stop arm -- an armed conflict that tried to keepthem from happening, but that's a -- >> -- different issue than stoppingit, making peace in other words. >> bruce jentleson: are you thinkingof any particular cases, or -- >> no. we'll have to talk more. >> maybe it has something todo with a category that -- >> bruce jentleson: yeah, yeah. i mean, i think i try toget at the global peace --
i mean, there are many differentways and at the beginning of the book i say -- i say there's alittle bit, you know, that this kind of change, it's top down, middleout and bottom up, you know, there's the people power,there's the [inaudible] square and there's the people powerthat brought down marcos in the philippines in the 1980's. and all of those are importantin global change, i'm just trying to focus on the particularrole of leaders without saying it's thebe all and the end all.
and some of our politicalscience colleagues, of course, want me to get a largerend and build a model and do the regression analysis, but neither you nor igo there in that, so. >> i think we'll stop there, soplease join me in thanking bruce. >> bruce jentleson:thanks very much. >> this has been a presentationof the library of congress. visit us at library of congress.gov.
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